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Lack of insight in schizophrenia is a key feature of the illness and is associated with both positive and negative clinical outcomes.
Previous research supports that neurocognitive dysfunction is related to lack of insight, but studies have not examined how
neurocognition relates to change in insight over time. Therefore, the current study sought to understand how performance on
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) differed between participants with varying degrees of change in insight over a 6-month
period. Fifty-two patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder were administered the WCST and Positive and Negative
Syndrome Scale (PANSS) at baseline, and the PANSS was again administered at a 6-month follow-up assessment. Results indicated
that while neurocognition was related to insight at baseline, it was not related to subsequent change in insight. The implications of
findings for conceptualization and assessment of insight are discussed.

1. Introduction
Lack of insight into one’s illness has been cited as common
among people with psychotic disorders and in particular
schizophrenia. Lack of insight can be manifested in the denial
or lack of awareness of the presence or impact of symptoms
or the need for treatment [1]. Those with schizophrenia have
been found to have higher levels of impaired insight in comparison to other psychotic disorders [2–6], with some studies
citing this as the most common clinical phenomenon linked
with schizophrenia [7, 8]. From a broader perspective, lack
of insight reflects not so much the absence of a single piece
of knowledge but a failure to construct an adaptive narrative
account of the challenges posed by having a psychiatric illness
[9, 10].
Although not a diagnostic criterion, lack of insight has
become an important topic in the schizophrenia literature
due to its utility as a prognosis indicator [11, 12] and
potential marker of a subtype of the illness [13]. A better
understanding of the etiological correlates of insight could

enhance treatment modalities [11], improve prevention, and
elucidate the relationship between insight and other clinical
symptoms [14]. A number of such associations have already
been found, including correlations between poor insight and
severity of psychopathology [4, 15, 16], increased number
of hospitalizations [4, 15], violent behavior [17, 18], lower
treatment adherence [4, 19, 20], and poor premorbid or
present adjustment [21]. Despite recognition as an important
concept within behavioral science, reaching consensus as
to what constitutes insight has proved challenging. Initially,
insight was considered a dichotomous construct that was
either present or absent and was measured by a patient’s
verbal recognition of existing psychological difficulties [22].
This conceptualization, however, has evolved into one of
multidimensionality, where insight incorporates a multitude
of phenomena [23], and is measured on a continuum. With
this multidimensional approach have come a variety of new
definitions. Such definitions include a combination of any
number of the following dimensions: acceptance of the illness
label, awareness of having a mental disorder, perceived need
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for treatment, awareness of treatment benefit, attribution
of benefits to treatment, awareness of signs and symptoms,
awareness of social consequences of illness, attribution of
signs and symptoms to having a mental disorder, and lack
of judgment [24]. Additionally, it has been argued that,
beyond these dimensions, ethnicity, culture, interpersonal
factors, education, social class, or intellectual functioning
plays important roles in insight [24]. Despite inconsistent
definitions across studies, there are a number of common
components to the majority of definitions, with most including awareness of having a mental disorder and awareness and
attribution of symptoms [22, 24–27].
As a result of the inconsistency in defining insight, there
is a lack of continuity in how the construct is measured an
inconsistency used by some to explain contradictory findings
within the insight and the psychosis literature [28]. In part,
the difficulty of defining and measuring insight is explained
by one’s theoretical orientation regarding the origins of
impaired insight [24]. Existing theories attribute insight to
positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms [1, 29], to
defense mechanisms [30–33], and to culturally dependent
and socially constructed views of insight [24].
Those utilizing a neurological framework for understanding impaired insight hypothesize that, like those suffering
from anosognosia (a clinical syndrome in which neurological disturbances are denied), lack of insight in psychosis
results from abnormalities in neuroanatomical structures
[34]. Similarly, those conceptualizing insight as a result
of neurocognitive dysfunction suggest that neurocognitive
impairment decreases one’s capacity to construct a personal
narrative for understanding one’s experience with illness, a
concept that is thought to be involved in insight [9, 10].
Within the neurocognitive dysfunction literature, discrepant results have been found regarding the association
between such dysfunction and diminished insight [15, 35–37].
Like the broader area of neurocognition and insight, studies
investigating executive functioning and diminished insight
have produced contradictory findings. Despite lacking strong
consensus, studies have, with some consistency, found crosssectional associations between impaired insight and the
WCST. Specifically, previous research indicates that categories completed and perseverative errors from the WCST are
significantly, albeit modestly, associated with insight [38–44].
Some, however, have failed to replicate such findings [26, 45–
48].
In 2006, a meta-analysis, conducted by Aleman et al. [35],
included 35 studies investigating the relationship between
various insight measures and five cognitive domains (total
cognition, IQ only, memory, frontal executive function,
and performance on the WCST). Results from this study
indicated a significant cross-sectional relationship between
insight and the WCST, with an effect size of 𝑟 = 0.23. Aleman
et al. [35] noted the unique role perseveration errors played
in impaired insight. This conclusion proffered by Aleman
et al. [35] is found elsewhere within the literature [23, 43, 49].
While there appears a modest cross-sectional relationship between the WCST and insight, contradictory results
have made the nature of this relationship unclear. A major
limitation of prior studies is that they have not examined
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whether the WCST predicts change in insight over time. A
better understanding of the prospective relationship between
WCST (specifically perseveration errors) and insight could
provide useful information about the trajectory of patients
with impaired insight. Therefore, the current study aimed to
assess how performance on neurocognitive measures differed
between participants with varying degrees of insight over a 6month period. It was hypothesized that those with worsening
insight would show more neurocognitive dysfunction than
those who remained stable or improved in insight.

2. Materials and Methods
Participants were 52 patients (51 male, 1 female) receiving
outpatient services from either a midwestern psychiatric
outpatient VA clinic or a local CMHC. Participants received
a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia (𝑛 = 38) or schizoaffective disorder (𝑛 = 14). The mean number of lifetime
hospitalizations was 7.8 (sd = 7.90) with an average first
occurrence at age 27 (sd = 6.34). The mean age was 47.2 (sd =
9.01). Mean education was 13.8 (sd = 4.29). Participants
were primarily White (𝑛 = 34) and African American (𝑛 =
17), with one Latino. No participants had been hospitalized,
changed medication, or changed housing in the month prior
to enrolling in the study. Participants with active substance
dependence or intellectual disability were excluded from
participation.
Clinical symptoms of schizophrenia were assessed using
the PANSS [50, 51]. The scale is composed of 30 items and is
used widely in clinical and research settings. It is regarded as a
reliable tool for symptom assessment [52]. In accordance with
previous research on the factor structure of the PANSS [53,
54], the current study utilized the five-factor model (hostility,
emotional discomfort, positive and negative symptoms, and
cognition) in assessing clinical symptoms of schizophrenia
[55].
Insight was assessed using the PANSS item G12. G12 is
a global clinical assessment of lack of judgment and insight.
It measures one’s level of insight by assessing one’s ability to
recognize psychiatric illness, need for treatment, decisionmaking, and planning.
Executive functioning was assessed using the WCST. The
WCST was developed by Grant and Berg in 1948 [56] and
is thought to measure preservation, set shifting, and abstract
thinking [56, 57]. The WCST is a common measure of executive functioning within the neuropsychological literature
[58–60].
Participants were recruited from VA Medical Center’s
comprehensive day hospital where they were receiving outpatient treatment. Participants were in a postacute or stable
phase of their disorder (no hospitalizations or alterations
in their medication or housing within the last month).
Through chart reviews, individuals identified as having a
history of mental retardation were excluded from the study.
Once informed consent was obtained, a clinical psychologist
confirmed diagnoses using the Structured Clinical Interview
from DSM-IV (SCID) [61]. Participants were then given
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Table 1: Correlation matrix of neurocognition, insight, and clinical variables.

(1) WCST persev
(2) WCST categories
(3) PANSS positive
(4) PANSS negative
(5) PANSS hostility
(6) PANSS emotion
(7) PANSS cognition
(8) Insight baseline
(9) Insight change
∗

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

−0.78∗∗
0.16
0.23
0.08
0.11
0.33∗
0.25
0.01

−0.33∗
−0.16
−0.04
−0.1
−0.33∗
−0.31∗
0.06

0.31∗
0.38∗∗
0.5∗∗
0.45∗∗
0.09
0.01

−0.01
0.27
0.46∗∗
0.26
−0.14

0.28∗
0.28∗
0.23
−0.13

0.1
−0.18
−0.02

0.6∗∗
0.05

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

∗∗

the WCST and PANSS at baseline and the PANSS again at
a 6-month follow-up assessment.
Initially, a correlation matrix was created using the
variables of insight (change scores), insight at baseline, WCST
(perseveration errors, categories completed) demographics,
and total scores of the PANSS five factors (positive symptoms, negative symptoms, cognition, hostility, and emotional
discomfort; the cognition total score did not include the G12
item as this was used to assess insight). Insight change scores
were computed prior to analysis by subtracting baseline
from endpoint insight scores. Any variable found to correlate
significantly with insight was then entered into a multiple
regression analysis. To account for baseline insight scores,
insight change scores were entered as the dependent variable.
To examine if different patterns would appear if insight
change was assessed categorically, participants were grouped
into one of 3 groups based on their insight change scores:
those that improved in insight, those that declined in insight,
and those that did not change. A MANOVA was then conducted to assess whether those with worsening insight over 6months demonstrate more neurocognitive dysfunction when
compared to those with improved or static insight. WCST
variables (categories completed, perseverative responses) and
change scores from the PANSS five factors were entered
as outcome variables. PANSS change scores were created
by subtracting endpoint from baseline factor scores for the
following factors: positive, negative, cognition (excluding
G12), hostility, and emotional discomfort.

3. Results
Table 1 shows correlations between variables of interest
(change in insight, baseline insight, PANSS factors, and
WCST). As this table indicates, no variables were significantly
correlated with change in insight. The PANSS cognitive factor
was most strongly correlated with baseline insight. WCST
categories completed had a more modest, yet significant,
negative correlation with baseline insight.
Since no significant relationships were found between
change in insight and other variables, a regression analysis
predicting change in insight was not preformed. However,
based on the relationships found in the correlation matrix,

a multiple regression predicting baseline insight was conducted, with WCST categories completed, the PANSS cognitive factor, perseveration errors, and the PANSS negative
factor entered as predictors. Perseveration errors and the
PANSS negative factor were included in this regression
analysis since they approached significant correlations with
baseline insight. Results indicated that the model significantly
predicted baseline insight (𝑟2 = .378, F(4, 46) = 6.998,
𝑃 < .001). Of the predictors, only the PANSS cognitive factor
significantly contributed to the model (beta = .575, 𝑃 < .001).
Participants were then grouped into categories based on
whether their insight score increased, decreased, or did not
change between baseline and 6 months. 10 participants (20%)
were categorized as improved, 8 as decreased (15%), and 33
(65%) were unchanged. Mean WCST perseverative responses
was 41.5 (sd = 33.3) for the improved insight group, 42.75 (sd
= 36.75) for the declined insight group, and 38.94 (sd = 28.67)
for the unchanged insight group. Mean WCST categories
completed for the improved, declined, and unchanged insight
groups were 3.1 (sd = 1.97), 3.5 (sd = 2.27), and 3.3 (sd = 2.2),
respectively. To assess if the WCST or PANSS scores differed
between these 3 groups, a MANOVA was conducted, which
failed to demonstrate a statistically significant difference
between groups on any of the outcome variables (F(14, 86)
= 1.12, 𝑃 > .05).

4. Discussion
Neither the PANSS cognitive factor nor WCST variables
were found to statistically significantly predict change in
insight, thus failing to support the current study’s hypothesis.
Similarly, a MANOVA failed to find group differences on
WCST variables between insight trajectories. These findings
indicate that neurocognition remains similar across insight
trajectories. One possible interpretation of these findings is
that neurocognitive functioning, and specifically the capacity
for cognitive flexibility, is unassociated with insight trajectory and that other factors would account for insight
change. In addition, the regression analysis predicting baseline insight indicated that, despite a significant correlation
between WCST perseveration errors and baseline insight,
WCST perseveration errors did not significantly contribute to
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the prediction of insight when other factors were included in
the equation. While perseveration errors have been found to
be predictive of insight by others [43, 49], the predictive value
of perseveration went unsupported in this study, a conclusion
also drawn by Collins et al. [46] and Rossell et al. [62].
Like perseveration errors, categories completed also failed to
predict baseline insight. Of those studies assessing whether
categories completed predict insight, most have found this
variable to have little to no predictive value [39, 41, 62].
An alternative explanation for finding a lack of relationship between the WCST and insight change is the lack
of sensitivity of the current study’s insight measure. While
the PANSS item G12 measures the concepts of awareness of
illness, illness severity, and need for treatment, this item could
simply be measuring fluctuations in agreement or rejection
of symptoms/labels and failing to capture aspects of insight
that some argue to be central to the construct (i.e., capacity
to construct a personal narrative of illness experience that can
be understood by others). Therefore, it is possible that insight,
as measured by the PANSS, functions independently of
neurocognition. Perhaps a more sensitive measure of insight,
like that proposed by Lysaker et al. [9, 10], would better
capture the relationship between neurocognitive dysfunction
and changes in insight over time. Indeed, the capacity to
construct a personal narrative would be diminished by
problems in forming concepts, profiting from correction, and
conceptual flexibility (perseveration errors). It is presumable
that the capacity for abstract thinking, change and refinement
of a narrative, and integration of feedback from others would
aid in the construction of a coherent and understandable
narrative.
Despite adding to the literature by assessing the prospective relationship between neurocognition and insight, the
current study had a number of limitations. First, the sample
size was small, restricting statistical power. Although a
smaller sample size is not uncommon within this vein of
research [41, 62], a larger sample would provide a better
understanding of the relationships between the current
study’s variables and allow more confident interpretations
of these relationships. Second, change in insight groups was
small; therefore, the lack of findings could be the result of
a restriction in range for the insight variable. Third, insight
was measured using the G12 item of the PANSS. Although
this measure of insight is common within the literature,
an independent insight scale would have provided greater
confidence in interpreting the relationship between insight
and the PANSS cognitive factor. Using a measure of insight
that facilitated analyzing various components of insight (i.e.,
current awareness of symptoms, past awareness of symptoms)
could have provided a better understanding of how different aspects of insight relate to neurocognitive and clinical
variables. Fourth, assessing WCST at multiple points in time
would have provided further opportunity to understand the
relationship between WCST and insight. Finally, participants
in this study were relatively stable outpatients. Investigating
insight in a first episode or inpatient sample may have
provided a greater degree of variance in insight and symptom
severity.
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Future research should investigate neurocognitive difference between insight trajectories using a multidimensional
measure of insight, as opposed to a unidimensional measure.
Specifically, assessing whether WCST (perseveration errors
or categories completed) relates to various aspects of insight
(rather than insight as a whole) could shed light on the
nature of the insight-neurocognition relationship. Utilizing
a measure of insight that incorporates a narrative approach
could prove useful in understanding how neurocognitive
dysfunction, and perseveration errors in particular, affects
one’s ability for narrative construction. One possibility that
remains unexplored is that poorer neurocognition could
lead to an inability to construct a personal narrative that
provides an alternate understanding of illness experiences
(e.g., one that does not involve mental illness). This inability
to construct a personal narrative could actually result in
higher superficial insight (e.g., shallow agreement with the
label but no in-depth understanding) for individuals with
diminished neurocognition as they would be unable to
provide alternative accounts of their symptoms (see Roe
et al. [63], for a discussion of how narrative insight can
be independent from more superficial insight). This could
ultimately lead to greater denial so as to avoid the negative
stigma attached to identification with mental illness.

5. Conclusions
Findings from the current study lend mixed support for
the relationship between neurocognition and insight. While
WCST was not found to be predictive of insight, the PANSS
cognitive factor significantly contributed to the regression
model, suggesting a relationship between insight and a
more general measure of cognition. These findings suggest
that performance on the WCST fails to delineate between
insight trajectories, when insight is conceptualized as need for
treatment, illness awareness, and illness severity. A narrative
approach to understanding insight may help in elucidating
how neurocognition relates to insight trajectory, as conceptual flexibility, concept formation, and benefitting from
feedback likely contribute to the capacity to construct a
personal narrative.
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